OPINION: The price of CARICOM countries’ competing foreign policy dispositions

Last Updated on Thursday, 1 January 2026, 13:52 by Writer

By Dr. Nand C. Bardouille

The 14 sovereign Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states have struggled to collectively mount a coherent foreign policy response to the U.S. military’s now months-long surge into the Caribbean, unfolding under the aegis of “Operation Southern Spear.”

Dissension has surfaced within this bloc’s ranks, with the fractious nature of associated intrastate relations recently coming to light.

Conspicuously, Trinidad and Tobago has pursued a radical break with many of its sister CARICOM member states’ respective foreign policy stances on “Operation Southern Spear.” As I contend in an article published in the December 11 edition of the Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, this operation is emblematic of America’s hegemonic stratagem for the Western Hemisphere.

The foreign policy-related differences arising do not just pit Trinidad and Tobago against virtually all of its sister CARICOM member states, though.

Guyana has come out in support of U.S. power projection in the Caribbean, at a juncture when Washington is leaning in “to strengthen and expand Guyana’s strategic partnership with the United States.”

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also recently signalled Jamaica is among a group of countries in the Caribbean Basin that — inclusive of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago — “openly cooperate with [the United States].”

Indeed, a recent development in U.S.-Jamaica relations is on the radar of analysts. Namely, and with little by way of public messaging on the engagement, high-level Jamaican and U.S. delegations met in Kingston on December 11.

On December 27, in his capacity as outgoing CARICOM Chair, Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness sounded an optimistic tone about the regional grouping’s accomplishments in recent times. That said, under his watch, the bloc’s balancing act regarding the regional and national interest took a hit from Trump 2.0.

Accordingly, Holness cautioned his regional counterparts that “[t]he current international environment requires our Region to act with clarity, cohesion, and strategic discipline.”

This viewpoint adds a fresh layer to the concern of CARICOM insiders that differences among member states over “Operation Southern Spear” will likely not be the last test of CARICOM unity vis-à-vis Trump 2.0.

This is the price of CARICOM member states’ competing foreign policy dispositions in respect of Trump 2.0.

In 2026, given a shifting balance of interests, the bloc has its work cut out for it in dealing with Washington in foreign policy terms.

Insofar as uncertainties about the U.S.-facing foreign policy road ahead loom large, the next CARICOM summit could potentially be a crucial factor in efforts to grapple with the harsh realities that have beset this bloc since this past September.

Member states and the regional grouping’s principal administrative organ — i.e. the Guyana-headquartered CARICOM Secretariat — will have to bring pertinent diplomatic channels at their disposal to bear on the situation.

Barring such a sustained effort, the summit may well fall short on the above stated outcome.

Even if all goes to plan beforehand, this summit may not necessarily help to turn the corner on deep-rooted foreign policy divisions.

Such a scenario would only increase the diplomatic cost that already looms large over CARICOM, weighing down the bloc and aspects of its international relations with third parties.

All eyes are on the summit in question, scheduled to be held early in the new year.

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Nand C. Bardouille, Ph.D., is the manager of The Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean in the Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies (The UWI) St. Augustine Campus, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of The UWI.